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NEGOTIATION FOR UNIFICATION PROCESS
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH IN KOREA:
LIVING SYSTEMS APPROACH

Lane Tracy
College of Business
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701, U.S.A.
The unification of North and South Korea has been sought ever since Korea was divided in 1945, In recent years hope has been raised by the example of the reunification of East and West Germany, which is often regarded as a parallel case. From the viewpoint of living systems analysis, however, there are important differences. In this paper I shall examine Korea as a living system and suggest ways in which that society might be united and strengthened through negotiation. I shall also look at basic requirements for successful negotiation and suggest methods that might improve chances.

Keywords: living systems, society, template, reproducer, decider, boundary, negotiation.

Living Systems Analysis
Living systems theory assumes that cells, organs, organisms, groups, organizations, communities, societies, and supranational systems all possess the basic characteristics of life (Miller 1978). Beginning with cells, each higher level of living systems has emerged through a fray-out process by which the life-giving properties of a lower level are passed on and elaborated in the next higher level (Miller & Miller 1990). Thus, societies emerged from an elaboration of the properties of communities, with communities as the primary components.

Although a complete enumeration of the essential characteristics of living systems would require much more than this paper, certain elements are particularly germane to the discussion of Korean unification. These elements include the concepts of the society, the template, the reproducer subsystem, the decider subsystem, and the boundary subsystem. The three subsystems named are among the twenty critical subsystems that have been identified as being essential to life (Miller 1990). Not all of these subsystems are relevant to this paper, but the reproducer, decider, and boundary subsystems must be considered.

The Society

A society is a concrete living system composed of communities and lower levels of living systems as subsystems and components (Miller 1978: 747). Societies are totipotential, meaning that they contain all of the critical subsystems necessary for life, although they may require the assistance of other systems in carrying out some of the necessary processes. Most societies are large, with hundreds of communities and millions of people as components, and are recognized as nations, nation-states, kingdoms, or empires. A few societies, such as the Palestinian arabs and the Sri Lankan Tamils, may be in a transition state and not recognized as separate nations.

It is important to distinguish between a society and a people. A people may share a language and a culture, and yet not be a society because they lack a constitution or an effective government (Kim 1983). For further discussion of this point, see the later sections on the template and the decider subsystem.

The Korean peninsula is inhabited by a single people, but it is currently split into two societies. Historically, however, it has for the most part existed as a single society (Nahm 1988). Korea first became a unified society in 668 a.d. under the Shilla kingdom. Although that kingdom gradually disintegrated, Korea was again united in 936 a.d. under the Koryo kingdom, which lasted 475 years. Korea remained united during the Yi dynasty from 1392 until 1905 a.d., when it became a Japanese protectorate. Thus, except for short periods of turmoil or foreign domination, Korea was a single society for over twelve hundred years.

During Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 Korea remained unified but was a component of the Japanese empire. Korea was not a full-fledged society, because it could not make its own decisions independent of those made by Japan. Its status during that period might be considered analogous to that of one of the states of the United States, although it should be recognized that Korea was not voluntarily a vassal state.

One of the ways in which unification of Korea differs from reunification of Germany is that, prior to its division in 1945, Germany was a single society, whereas Korea had not been a complete society since 1910. Furthermore, Germany had been a democracy and could return to a form of decision making that it had used before. Korea had been a kingdom and could no longer reasonably return to that form of government.

The Template and the Reproducer Subsystem

All living systems must possess a template from the moment of their origin. The template is the program for the system's structure and process and for its growth and development (Miller 1978: 18). The template for cells, organs, and organisms is embedded in their genes. For groups and higher levels, however, it is contained in a charter or constitution, usually in written form.

The reproducer subsystem of a living system provides the template for its descendants, organizes matter-energy with which they can begin a new life, and nurture them until they become independent and self supporting (Miller 1978: 55). At the level of societies, the key element of the reproducer process is the establishment of a constitution and a decision-making structure that is accepted as legitimate by the people and by other societies. Ordinarily, power is also required to enforce the laws and decrees of the new society and to protect it from enemies (Miller & Miller 1992a: 21).

Currently, North and South Korea each possess a constitution. The constitution of South Korea was promulgated on July 17, 1948; that of North Korea was adopted in September of the same year (Nahm 1988). Each constitution specifies a particular form of government, the structure and process of decision making bodies, criteria for citizenship, and many other aspects of governmental structure and process.

The constitutions of the two nations are very different. Their only common point of origin is the Korean language and culture. They are not like the biological offspring of cellular mitosis, with each new cell possessing the genes of the original. Rather, each constitution is based on a different model, one democratic and the other socialist. In that respect they are more like the products of sexual reproduction in which each nation had the same mother but a different father. North Korea was the offspring of Korea and the Soviet Union. South Korea sprang from the union of Korea and the United States.

If the constitutions of North and South Korea had more in common, unification would be easier. The common elements could be taken as a starting point for negotiation of a new constitution for the combined populations. Likewise, if there had been an acceptable constitution before the division of the nation, it could be used as a point of departure. But the history of monarchy and then occupation provides no such prior viable template.

Unification requires, first, a constitution that is acceptable to both North and South. The constitution need not be complete; all constitutions are open to amendment. But it must specify enough of the structure and process of governance that the new nation can make the kinds of national decisions required by today's competitive world.

For societies that already exist there are only two known paths to unification under a single constitution. One is the path of conquest and domination. In 1950 North Korea tried this path but failed. Even so, the North did not give up hope of dominance until recently, and the South may at times have nursed a belief that the North would collapse and allow the South to take over.

The other path, negotiation, has been tried at least twice, in 1972 and again in 1992 (Koh 1992). I will return to the topic of negotiation shortly.

Are North and South Korea capable of reproducing a united Korea? Each nation has a reproducer subsystem, consisting of the capability to draft a constitution and to enforce it within its own territory. The problem is that in order to give birth to a united Korea either one nation must extend its dominion over the territory of the other, or else both must agree on a common constitution and be willing to cede dominion to the new society. Both methods of societal reproduction have occurred many times in the past in Korea or elsewhere, but the first is probably much more common than the second. In either case, one or both of the existing societies would cease to exist, because they would no longer be making decisions for themselves.

The Decider Subsystem

Although the template provides instructions for system structure and process, it cannot anticipate every eventuality. In order to cope with a changing environment, every living system must possess its own decision-making capabilities. The decider subsystem is "the essential critical subsystem which controls the entire system, causing its subsystems and components to interact (Miller 1978: 18)."

For a society the decider subsystem consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. It ranges from the top officials of each branch down to the lowest clerks and functionaries. In a democracy it includes, at times, all of the voting citizens.

At present North and South Korea each possess their own independent decider subsystems. The earlier influences that shaped the two nations in different ways have long since been thrown off. Yet the two decider subsystems are very dissimilar in structure and process, because they are modeled on different ideologies. A unified Korea would require a strong decider subsystem, yet it may be that neither of the currer subsystems is acceptable as a model. Also in question is whether and to what extent each of the existing decider subsystems is willing to modify itself and accept the participation of the other.

One of the hopes for unification has been that one of the systems will collapse, as happened in Germany (Yang 1992). The absence of a functioning decider subsystem in East Germany made it relatively easy, as well as imperative, to accept the existing decider subsystem of West Germany as the model for the new joint decider. However, despite moments of weakness, there has been no similar collapse in either of the Koreas.

Since 1960 the unification plan proposed by North Korea has called for a confederation of North and South (Ok 1992), From a living systems viewpoint a confederation is quite different from a unified society. The difference lies in the template and the decider subsystem. A confederation would maintain two separate constitutions and decider subsystems for many purposes. The joint decisions of a confederation would require ratification by the separate governments. Confederation would be a step toward unification, but it would not create a unitary Korean society.

It would be extremely difficult to design a workable decider subsystem from nothing. Thus, part of any negotiation for unification must focus on finding a mutually acceptable model for the new decider subsystem. It may be that the negotiation process itself, offers a model.

The Boundary Subsystem

The boundary subsystem separates a living system from its environment. The boundary subsystem "surrounds and protects vulnerable components, acts as a barrier to free movement of matter, energy, and information in and out of the system, and filters inputs and outputs by allowing some but not others to pass (Miller & Miller 1992: 23)."

A society's boundary does not necessarily coincide with the territorial borders of the nation. "The boundary of a society is the outer limit of the spatial distribution of the society's living components (Miller & Miller 1992: 36)." On the one hand, uninhabited islands might be included within a nation's borders but not be part of the boundary. On the other hand, representatives of the government and private citizens may be scattered all over the globe, taking the boundary with them wherever they go. As an example, South Korean troops serving as part of a United Nations peace-keeping force wear the insignia of South Korea to show that they carry the boundary with them. The South Korean Olympic team carries the flag and represents the nation as the athletes compete in Atlanta. The boundary of South Korea encompasses these far-flung components, even though the territorial borders do not.

In some cases the boundary and the border both are extended overseas. South Korean embassies in other nations are regarded as Korean soil and fly the flag of South Korea. The border of South Korea extends around its embassies. Yet the South Korean embassy in Washington, D.C. may employ Americans who work within the border but not within the boundary of South Korea. Components that are found within the system but are not part of the system are called inclusions (Miller 1978: 33).

The boundary and border between North and South Korea currently serve as severe barriers to trade, travel, and the exchange of information between the two nations. The boundary filters are turned very high, to the degree that very little passes through. Indeed, even though they possess a common language, the citizens of either nation find it much easier to communicate with those of a third nation, such as Japan, than with each other. Korea can never be a single society so long as such a boundary exists.

Applying these concepts to Korean unification, what is desired is a removal of the border and the boundary between the North and South and a joining of the boundaries that surround each nation into a single boundary encompassing the Korean people. The boundary between the nations serves as a barrier to commerce, travel, and information. Its removal would facilitate the reuniting of separated families, the economic development of the region, and the reunification of Korean culture. The resources that are currently devoted by both nations to maintaining the border between them could be redeployed, thereby increasing the power of the Korean people as a whole.

Negotiation
Since the 1960s the primary approach toward unification of Korea has been negotiation between representatives of the North and South. Negotiations resulted in agreements in 1972 and 1992, but neither agreement called for full unification of Korea. Yet negotiation can lead to creation of a unified society.

Negotiation is an important part of the reproducer process for living systems at all levels above the organism (Tracy 1995). One of the four basic uses of negotiation is to obtain agreement on the template for a new social system. Negotiation has resulted in the creation of supranational systems such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). It has founded nations such as the United States of America. It is frequently employed to develop the plans for business partnerships, joint ventures between companies, and mergers.

Negotiation provides a means of combining features from the templates of two or more social systems into a new system's template. In effect it can perform the same function as in the blending of genes at the conception of a new zygote through sexual reproduction. Each new group, organization, community, society, or supranational system that is created through negotiation tends to carry with it a mixture of the beliefs, ideas, and cultures of its creators.

Unfortunately, negotiating the template of a new society is neither as easy nor as pleasurable as sexual reproduction. In fact, the first question we must ask is why the existing societies would engage in such an arduous enterprise. What is in it for them? After all, in most cases sexual reproduction does not involve the immediate demise of the parents or their absorption into the new entity, as is the case when two or more societies negotiate to merge themselves into a unified society.

The answer, in a case such as the creation of a united Korea, might be that the existing societies perceive a greater good to be had from unification. A unified Korea could be more powerful, more economically self sufficient, and a better provider for its people than the existing two societies.

Is that enough of a motive? Probably not. It might be sufficient for the common people, but not for the current rulers and those who make their living from the status quo. For them there are other potential gains and losses. The gains might be enhanced status and greater power in a united Korea, but the potential losses include loss of office, loss of livelihood, and even loss of life or liberty. Thus, those who are currently in power seek assurances that the new society will still provide an important role for them. And it is those in power who must approve any negotiated agreement.

What we have here is a very common phenomenon in living systems theory. It is a mixing and interaction of the several levels that are involved. Negotiation is actually carried out by individuals acting in groups for the benefit of organizations, communities and societies, as well as for the leaders of those systems. Yet people can never fully cease making decisions for themselves or representing their own interests as they try to represent other systems (Tracy 1989: 139-155).

National leaders may be well aware of the benefits that would accrue to the people from unification. They may believe that many of those benefits would come to them as well, particularly if they can snatch them from the other side. But the other side knows this as well, and is probably seeking the same benefits for itself. How can either group of decision makers trust the other?

Trust

Trust is an essential ingredient of negotiations. Trust in the other participants is never absolute, but if some level of trust does not exist there is no point in negotiating. You must be able to trust at least that the other parties will carry out the terms that are agreed upon. Yet even that level of trust may be lacking in the case of North and South Korea. Prior agreements between the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang have not been fully implemented or have crumbled within a year (Koh 1992).

How can trust be developed so that negotiations can proceed? Trust is developed primarily through making promises and then keeping them. Even if the promises concern relatively minor matters, carrying them out demonstrates a willingness to honor one's word.

Examples in the case of Korea would include developing trade between the North and South, making progress in arms control, and putting into effect a plan to allow members of divided families to reunite. Eberstadt (1994) has described how broader and deeper commercial contacts between the two societies could lead to lowered tensions and a greater community of interests. Each trade that is carried out also leads to the development of trust and to the belief that it really is possible to deal safely with people on the other side of the border.

Putting together an arms control pact would also help to build trust and confidence in the peaceful intentions of the other side (Lho 1992). An example would be the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in 1986 which resulted in a detailed agreement to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. Such an agreement between Pyongyang and Seoul would allow each side to relax a bit and would provide evidence of trustworthiness as the accord was carried out.

Preceding the negotiation of agreements in 1972 and 1992 there were proposals for talks between the Red Cross representatives in North and South Korea for the purpose of reuniting separated families (Koh 1992). Successful agreement on such a humanitarian issue could lead to greater trust and willingness to discuss broader issues. Actually, in both cases broader talks erupted before the Red Cross negotiations could bear fruit. It could be argued that those broader negotiations would ultimately have been more successful if an agreement could first have been implemented on the exchange of family members. There was no opportunity to develop trust before the parties attempted to deal with more contentious issues.

Common Interests

The issue of reuniting separated families also illustrates another essential characteristic of successful negotiations. There must be common interests as well as divisive ones. The two governments had a common interest in bringing divided families together, both from humanitarian impulses and from the practical standpoint of public morale and loyalty. Having family members on the other side of an impenetrable bordei was a constant source of friction and a force undercutting loyalty to North or South.

On the other hand, there were also differing interests. Each side was worried about balance in the flow of people and their possessions, about breaches of security, and about national image. Although the topics of interest may have been the same for both parties, the desires of the parties differed. Finally, there were interests that clashed directly. For instance, each side wanted to see its own ideology accepted as the guiding ideology of the new society.

With respect to unification one must ask: What are the interests of North and South? There may be a common interest in the vision of a reunited people. There may also be a common interest in the economic revitalization that should ensue from unification. But the leaders of each nation have distinctly different interests concerning such matters as their continued participation in the government of a unified Korea, the ideological nature of that government, and the distribution of national income. Thus far these issues of conflict seem to have prevented more than a token consideration of the common interests.

What could cause the common interests to become more salient? One possibility is the introduction of an external threat. If it became apparent that some other nation was looking to gobble up the Korean peninsula, North and South would have a powerful motive to unite against the common threat. No such threat appears imminent, but the potential for economic domination by Japan and the young tigers of Southeast Asia might eventually provide such a force.

Conversely, common interests could surface because of a reduction in the forces pushing for division. To some extent this has happened with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the weakening of ties between South Korea and the United States. Both North and South could now disengage themselves from the ideological entanglements that made dialogue difficult. There is potential for looking into the common heritage of Korean culture as a source of political and economic arrangements that are peculiarly Korean.

Another possibility is that one party may lose the ability to pursue its interests effectively. This is basically what happened in Germany when the East German economy collapsed. Such an eventuality may not lead to successful negotiation, however.

Equality of Power

Successful negotiation assumes either a basic equality of power among the participants, or else a willingness of the more powerful parties to forgo use of their power. The problem with having one party collapse is that it often leads to domination and subordination, rather than a negotiated agreement. Unification might result, but it could be unstable.

Societies created by the subjugation of peoples often end in dissolution, as we have seen recently in the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. Negotiation, on the other hand, allows the parties to confront their differences and resolve them, rather than having them continue to smolder within the heart of the society. Even if, for instance, the economy of North Korea were to collapse, South Korea would be wise to pursue unification through negotiation rather than subjugation.

Determining whether a reasonable equality of power exists is often problematical. In the case of the two Korean nations, for instance, both have strong military power, but the South currently has greater economic power. The demands of the North that South Korea disavow military aid from the United States may be designed to equalize power, from their point of view, so that negotiations can proceed on an equal footing. Or it may be a ploy to achieve a power advantage as part of a strategy of dominance such as they have previously pursued.

It is possible to negotiate effectively even when one side has a predominance of power. To do so, the more-powerful party may publicly set aside its power advantage and agree to negotiate on the merits of the issues. Alternatively, a powerful, neutral third party may sponsor the negotiations and guarantee the safety of the participants.

In the case of North and South Korea there does not appear to be any powerful third party that could sponsor negotiations. Parties that might have sufficient power, such as China and the United States, are not perceived as neutral. The United Nations might be considered neutral, but it lacks power. If either side fears the power of the other, then it will be necessary for the other side to declare its intention not to use that power and to negotiate in good faith on the merits. This might mean a declaration from North Korea to refrain from using military power and from South Korea not to engage in economic blackmail.

Principled Negotiation

Assuming that the necessary conditions of at least some trust, acknowledgment of common interests, and equality of power are in place, successful negotiation is possible. The next question is: Are there rules or principles that make success more likely? The answer is clearly yes. The guidelines of principled negotiation, as developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project, have been shown to aid the process greatly, both in international and business negotiations (Fisher & Ury 1991; Lax & Sebenius 1986). Furthermore, the principled style of negotiation is the only style that makes sense when the purpose is to create a new living system (Tracy 1995),

In the typical negotiation process the people on the other side of the table are often viewed as the enemy. The primary objective of negotiators on both sides is to beat the other side. This leads each negotiating team to a strategy of taking firm positions and holding to them tenaciously, while threatening the other party with dire consequences if they do not make concessions. The result is often deadlock and no agreement. Even if sufficient concessions are made to reach agreement, it is likely to be less than optimal for both sides.

To avoid such outcomes, the first principle of principled negotiation is: Separate the people from the problem. In the case of Korea, the problem is to achieve unification. Demonizing the people on the other side and treating them as enemies wil not solve the problem, but will only make agreement more difficult. You must assume that the opposing negotiators and the people they represent are reasonable people who are sincerely interested in unification of Korea. If events prove they are not, then this is a separate problem.

The second principle is to focus on interests, not positions. In fact, it is better to avoid taking positions until considerable discussion has occurred. Instead, you should state your interests as you understand them and ask the other side to do the same. Your first interest might be to unite Korea under a single government and flag. Related interests could include removing barriers to trade and free movement of people within the peninsula, allowing the people to participate in the government, and consolidating military forces. When stated in general terms, these are issues that can be discussed at explored. When translated into positions such as "The government must be a democracy consisting of a president and a bicameral legislature freely elected by the people," the issues become much more contentious.

Ultimately, specifics cannot be avoided. Negotiation on unification will have to come to some agreement on the form of the government. The point is that positions of that form should not be the starting point. For instance, both sides may express an interest in allowing the people to participate in the government, but they have different positions on what this means. Tackling popular participation as an interest, they can explore why they are interested in it. Does it lead to a more stable government? A happier populace? Increased adaptability of the government to change? A greater willingness of the people to endure taxation and military conscription? Are any or all these interests in themselves? If so, are there any other reasonable ways to satisfy the interests? By exploring interests in this open fashion it is possible that both parties will come to positions that they had not even thought of before.

That brings us to the third principle: Create options for mutual gain. Options are generated by free exploration of interests. Not all options are good ones, but the negotiators should not worry about that at this stage. They should create as many options as possible, waiting until later to sort them out and evaluate them. Indeed, a brainstorming process is ideal for generation of options, because it allows the participants to build on each other's ideas and reserves judgment until later on the quality of those ideas (Osborn 1957). Brainstorming options can be carried out within each party or even with the opposing negotiating teams together.

Although I cannot anticipate the sorts of options that might be generated in Korean unification talks, I will offer an example. In discussing options for the form of the government, the two parties might look at Korean history for examples of the various kinds of government that have existed in the past. They might add forms of government from other nations that seem to have something to offer. Having compiled a list of possible forms, they could then discuss what they see as the pros and cons of each form. Although a particular form might be clearly unacceptable as a whole, it might have good features that could be added onto other forms. By discussing the options in this way, rather than starting from demands for a particular form, the two parties may be able to put together a proposal that contains entirely novel features, that reflects the history and culture of the Korean people, and that meets the interests of both parties.

What worries people the most about this style of negotiation is that their side may give away too much. If they favor a democratic style of government, for instance, might the negotiations not result in agreement on a style that includes elements of socialism and monarchy? The answer is yes, but only if those added elements meet their interests, or at least do not clash with them.

Protection against agreements that do not meet your own interests is the purpose of the final principle: Insist on using objective criteria to evaluate the outcome. If a proposed agreement does not meet these criteria, it should not be signed, no matter how much work has gone into it. Indeed, that work should always be regarded as a sunk cost, not an investment.

What sorts of criteria might apply in the case of Korean unification talks? I do not want to put thoughts into anyone's head, but it seems likely that one criterion for both sides would be that the existing political parties would have an opportunity to contend in any election to be held. Another might be that each region of the country and each significant segment of the population must have representation in the government.

Aside from protecting the parties from going too far, another way in which objective criteria are useful lies in challenging obstinacy on the other side. If the other party claims that a certain option is unacceptable, ask them what objective criterion it violates. If they can't show that the proposal violates any criteria, then the unreasonableness of their position is exposed. On the other hand, if they name a criterion that has been violated, you now know one of the standards by which they are judging the outcome and you may modify the proposal accordingly to meet their concerns.

Mediation

Principled negotiation is not simple or easy, and it may seem quite unnatural to people who are used to practicing a more competitive style of negotiation. In many cases a mediator or process consultant is needed to facilitate the process (Fisher 1978). A mediator is a neutral third party who has no power to force agreement, but can intervene in the negotiation process in various ways.

A mediator can instruct the parties on the principles and methods of principled negotiation and solicit their commitment to try it. If they agree to apply the principles, the mediator can then monitor the process, pointing out when the parties are straying from the process and suggesting ways to get back on track. The mediator's focus is on the negotiation process, not the outcome.

A more active style of mediation would be to propose use of the single-text procedure (Fisher & Ury 1991; Raiffa 1982). In this procedure a third party, after listening to the interests expressed by the parties, drafts an agreement and asks for criticism. A second draft is prepared, responding the criticism of the first one, and again is subjected to criticism. The process goes through as many iterations as are necessary until there are no further criticisms. The mediator then asks the parties to sign the agreement. This process puts the task of creating options primarily on the shoulders of the mediator. Thus, the mediator must be imaginative and knowledgeable about the topic of the negotiation. Even so, the negotiating parties retain responsibility for whatever agreement may result from the process.

Summary
Historically, Korea was an independent, unitary society for over 1,200 years. Since 1910, however, Korea has suffered first domination by Japan and then, in 1945, division into two very disparate societies. A boundary was erected between the people of the North and South, such that the flow of commerce, of information, and even of the people themselves has almost ceased. The governments of the two nations now make decisions for themselves and their citizens, rather than for the Korean people as a whole. There is a strong desire among the people to return to a unified Korea, but the road to that destination has proven to be difficult. Entrenched power, fear, entangling alliances and ideological differences have stood in the way.

The best hope for unification appears to lie in negotiation. The governments of the North and South have proven to be too equally matched for unification to occur through domination of one by the other. The process of principled negotiation is capable of producing the constitutional template necessary for creation of a unified Korea. What is required first, however, is the development of a modicum of mutual trust between the governments, perhaps through success with more modest agreements regarding trade, arms control, and reuniting families. Another requirement is recognition of common interests that transcend the conflicting interests of the two nations.

The technology of negotiation has expanded considerably in the past thirty years. New techniques of collaborative negotiation have been applied successfully in international negotiations to create the European Union, to construct a treaty on undersea exploration, and to resolve conflict between Israel and Egypt, for instance. The opportunity exists to apply these techniques, perhaps with the aid of mediation, to the task of Korean unification. Only then can Korea become a living system again.

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