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INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE BOUNDARY SYSTEM
Lane Tracy
Ohio University
Copeland Hall
Athens, Ohio 45701
Abstract
Internal security is vital to all living systems. An internal security subsystem encompassing the processes of immunity and error correction has been postulated as an additional critical subsystem. However, a reconceptualization of boundary allows the boundary subsystem to incorporate these processes. Pathologies of internal security processes are discussed. Suggestions are made for improving the immunity and error-correction processes and structures in groups, organizations, and societies. Keywords: living system, boundary subsystem, organism, organization, society, security, pathology.
A fundamental aspect of James G. Miller's living systems theory is the description and enumeration of those processes and structures that are critical to life [2]. Ideally, the theory should note all critical processes that are common to the seven levels of living systems, ranging from cells to supranational systems. To this end Miller listed nineteen critical subsystems of living systems, but recognized that other critical processes might exist.
Bosserman argued that the processes of immunity and error correction are critical to all living systems but are not fully represented in the original nineteen critical subsystems. He postulated a twentieth critical subsystem, "an internal security subsystem that protects a living system from undesirable external stresses or internal strains or disruptions" [1, p. 95]. Bosserman then proceeded to show the existence of internal security processes at each level and to generate hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of such processes.
The necessity of a twentieth critical subsystem was challenged by Walker and Theimann. Examining the correspondence between immune-system processes at the cell, organ, organism, and group levels, they concluded that "the immune system does not meet subsystem criteria because it largely overlaps with previously defined subsystems" [5, p. 152]. They suggested that internal security be considered a dormant subsystem that is aroused only when there is a real or perceived threat to the security of the system. They recognized, however, that internal security processes are not fully covered by Miller’s critical subsystems.
In this paper I show that a small change in the conception and definition of boundary would enable the incorporation of immunity and error-correction processes into the boundary subsystem. Nevertheless, the intent is not to bury these processes or minimize their importance. In particular, we must recognize the need for planning internal security processes at the group, organization, society, and supranational levels, where structures for security are not automatically provided.
Immunity, Error Correction, and the Boundary
As envisioned by Bosserman, the internal security subsystem protects the integrity of the system against two kinds of threats: external stresses and internal strains or disruptions. The normal processes of homeostasis and adjustment discussed by Miller also deal with stresses and strains, of course, but certain severe threats seem to require a more specialized and concentrated response. Stresses that threaten to damage components of the system, such as ingestion of harmful bacteria, viruses, and poisons, cause immunity processes to be activated. Error correction processes are activated by disruption of the template or by damage to components or subsystems.
Immunity
In the study of biology and medicine, immunity means resistance to or protection against potentially harmful agents that have entered the system. The organic structures and processes that provide protection from various illness-producing agents are called the immune system of the organism. Processes that grant immunity have been identified and studied in many different organisms. In mammals, for example, the immune system involves structures such as lymphatic vessels, lymph nodes, thymus, spleen, bone marrow, macrophages, and lymphocytes, as well as processes of lymph circulation and phagocytosis [3]. Structures for disease resistance in plants appear to be at the molecular level; processes include cell death and synthesis of RNA and proteins [4].
Bosserman describes functionally similar immunity processes at all levels of living systems [1]. Cells detect "foreign" inclusions such as viruses or toxins, and produce enzymes to digest them. Organs such as the thymus and spleen produce specialized cells to counteract specific antigens. Family and work groups may be alert to infestations of drugs and foreign ideas, and may act to isolate or destroy them. Societies and supranational systems construct very elaborate security systems to detect and combat intrusions of foreign pests, disease-carriers, spies, terrorists, weapons, and obscene literature.
In living systems terms the immune system may be defined as the set of structures and processes that detect potentially harmful or undesirable inclusions and act to isolate, transform, or extrude them. Inclusions to which an immune system reacts may be incompatible living systems such as disease-causing bacteria and espionage agents, or nonliving agents such as viruses, foreign genetic material, lethal chemicals, bombs, and foreign news broadcasts.
Processes. The key processes of the immune system at any level are (1) detection and recognition of foreign (i.e. non-system) material and (2) neutralization or elimination of the material through isolation, transformation, or extrusion. In the human immune system, for instance, phagocytes locate an inclusion (i.e. an antigen), recognize that it is not part of the system, and try to ingest and transform it with the help of leukocytes and/or complement. In the air defense system of a society a radar net detects inbound missiles or unidentified aircraft and notifies anti-missile batteries or fighter squadrons, which try to intercept and destroy the intruders. Note that the immune system does not necessarily know that the material is potentially harmful; it simply recognizes that the material is not part of the system.
Although immune systems appear to process foreign inclusions primarily as matter-energy, information processing is required in the detection stage and in directing defensive forces to the site of infection. Furthermore, the information content of intruders such as viruses and foreign news broadcasts may present a greater danger than their matter-energy content. By attacking the marker, the immune system isolates or destroys the potentially harmful information.
Pathology. A properly functioning immune system is known to be essential for the survival of most organisms. Pathologies of the immune system include (1) failure to detect a potentially harmful inclusion, (2) failure to distinguish between system and non-system inclusions, (3) jnadequate response or lack of a defense against a specific intruder, and (4) excessive use of system resources.
Dutch elm disease is a good example of what happens when a plant's immune system is unable to detect or develop a defense against a lifethreatening intruder. The AIDS epidemic has made us aware of consequences of inadequate response in the human immune system. Researchers have developed numerous vaccines to strengthen the immune systems of people and animals against various harmful intruders. Botanists and animal breeders have sought to develop genetic strains that are more disease-resistant.
Medical researchers have shown us that the immune system can cause illness as well as prevent it. Autoimmune diseases arise when the immune system fails to distinguish between foreign inclusions and components of the system. Recognizing and destroying potentially harmful agents while ignoring components of the system (self) requires rigid maintenance of self-tolerance. "In view of the complexity of immune regulation, it is not surprising that the maintenance of self-tolerance can go awry and that the resultant [autoimmune diseases] reflect the entire spectrum of immune responses" [3, p. 257]. Rheumatoid arthritis is a fairly common form of autoimmune disease.
The immune system may also overreact to an external stress. Shock reactions are supposed to protect organisms from trauma by redirecting resources to the area of damage, but in some cases they succeed in shutting down and killing the whole system. Organizations sometimes protect the integrity of their culture at the expense of becoming overly rigid and unresponsive to new ideas. A nation may devote so much of its resources to defense that its economy is severely damaged.
The effectiveness of the immune system in attacking foreign agents can also present a problem. Attempts at blood transfusion were stymied for centuries because too many patients died of adverse reactions to new blood, until Landsteiner discovered the major human blood groups in 1900. The history of organ transplants is largely the history of the struggle to overcome an organism's tendency to reject foreign tissue. Groups and societies often reject potentially-valuable new members because their skin is the wrong color or they speak the wrong language.
Error Correction
Error-correction processes differ from immunity processes in that the source of the foreign material or information is the system, itself, rather than the environment. In some cases the same processes and structures may provide both immunity and error correction. For instance, cancer cells may be attacked by the same phagocytes that act upon bacteria. On the other hand a system may deliberately set up separate structures for immunity and error correction. In the United States the armed forces and CIA are supposed to immunize the society from external threats, whereas the police and FBI are intended to correct the errors of citizens.
Bosserman treats immunity and error-correction processes together as internal security processes [1]. Thus, his description of these processes at various levels of living systems includes examples of error correction at each level. Enzyme-mediated adjustment processes in cells help to repair errors in transcribing DNA. Some organs are able to surround and isolate cancerous tissue with a protective sheath. Organisms correct hemorrhaging through coagulation mechanisms. Animal groups attack and kill members that are born with defects or that become rogues. Organizations develop backup systems and archives as protection against breakdown of a computerized information system. Societies maintain elaborate systems of law to correct behavioral errors of their citizens. Supranational systems have means for disciplining members who deviate from the charter.
As with immunity processes, the key processes of error correction are (1) detection and recognition of material or information that deviates from the norm of the system, and (2) neutralization or elimination of the deviant material through isolation, transformation, or extrusion. The same pathologies also exist. For instance, democratic societies may at times be too open and vulnerable to demagogues and deviant political ideas, lacking the means to recognize the danger in them or to suppress them. Dictatorships, on the other hand, often become police states that suppress everything except the party line. Apartheid in South Africa and internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry by the United States during World War II are examples of an overactive or improperly tuned societal error-detection system attacking its own citizens. Ideally, error-correction processes allow a moderate amount of change to occur in the system, while correcting or moderating large, system-threatening changes.
Boundary
Miller defines the boundary subsystem as "the subsystem at the perimeter of a system that holds together the components which make up the system, protects them from environmental stresses, and excludes or permits entry to various sorts of matter-energy and information" [2, p. 56]. As protection from stresses is already one of the functions of the boundary, the primary difficulty in incorporating immunity and errorcorrection processes within the boundary subsystem lies in the conception that the boundary is "at the perimeter" of the system. Is this spatial restriction necessary?
First, it should be recognized that boundaries of living systems typically are multi-layered. The boundary of human organisms, for instance, consists of several layers of skin tissue covered by oils and hair, to which layers of clothing are often added. Likewise, an organization may be protected at the boundary by receptionists, mail handlers, and shipping clerks who are surrounded by walls, doors, windows, fences, and security guards. Even cell boundaries typically consist of membranes surrounded by cell walls, capsules, or protective fluids. Obviously, the inner layers are less "at the periphery" than the outermost layer.
Furthermore, we have noted that the first step of immunity processes is awareness of the presence of a foreign inclusion. Recognition of the difference between inclusions or components that "belong" and those that do not is essential for adequate response and avoidance of autoimmune diseases. I submit, therefore, that the true boundary between a living system and its environment is at the line between belonging and not belonging (i.e. being foreign) to the system. That line does not necessarily lie at the perimeter of the system.
An inclusion, which by Miller's definition is within the perimeter, may be "a component or subsystem of the system if it carries out or helps jn carrying out a critical process of the system; otherwise it is part of the environment" [2, p. 33]. Thus, immunity processes, which detect whether or not an inclusion is part of the system, are at the interface between system and environment. Error-detection processes, which recognize when some part of the system has lost its normal system properties (i.e., ceased to belong), are also at the interface.
Functionally, internal security processes are the same as the external security processes provided by the boundary at the perimeter. In both cases the task is to recognize potentially harmful foreign matterenergy or information and act to neutralize or convert it. Like the boundary subsystem, internal security processes involve processing of both matter-energy and information. Recognition of internal security processes and structures as part of the boundary simply adds a new inner layer.
In order to incorporate all security processes within the boundary subsystem, I suggest the following restatement of the definition:
The boundary subsystem is the subsystem at the interface between the system and its environment that recognizes and holds together the components which make up the system, protects them from environmental stresses and internal disruptions, and excludes or permits entry to various sorts of matter-energy and information. [New elements in bold type.]
This definition preserves the essential character of the boundary as the subsystem that maintains the integrity of the system and protects it from its environment. At the same time it allows us to fine tune our conception of the line between system and environment.
Planning Internal Security for Groups, Organizations, and Societies
Internal security structures and processes in groups, organizations, and societies are often rudimentary or unplanned. For example, families often secure the house with locks, latches, and alarms, but do not anticipate that a friend or family member may go berserk and harm them. Yet murder and rape are more often committed by acquaintances or family members than by strangers. Business firms take precautions to maintain the integrity of their financial records, yet are often surprised and chagrined when a trusted employee absconds with company funds. Nations may spend billions of dollars for defense against attack by air, sea, or land, but leave large stretches of border unguarded and provide little or no protection of their infrastructure from terrorists and saboteurs.
It is not possible to defend against everything, and security precautions can be overdone. Nevertheless, groups, organizations, and societies might be able to learn something from observing how organisms provide for internal security. For instance, organisms do not attempt to maintain a full-scale active defense against the host of bacteria, viruses, and poisons that are present in the environment. Instead, as a first line of defense a supply of general-purpose defenders is held in reserve and, when needed, is directed to the site of the problem. A similar system is found in groups that maintain a rainy-day reserve fund, jn communities that have a volunteer fire department, and in nations that maintain a military reserve force.
Higher organisms, however, have a more effective and efficient set of structures and processes for internal security. When a known antigen is detected, antibodies designed specifically to destroy that antigen are quickly cloned. The general reserve force has only to hold off the attack while these antibodies are being produced. Thus, rather than maintaining a large reserve force at high cost, these organisms maintain a smaller set of structures capable of rapidly producing more effective defenders when needed. This is a trick that few organizations or societies seem to have learned. Applied to weapons production, for instance, it would mean that a nation would not stockpile large amounts of guns and ammunition, but would maintain the capability of producing them rapidly on demand. A business firm, rather than training each employee only for a specific function, would provide much cross-training so that employees could quickly respond to an emergency.
Groups, organizations, and societies should also pay more attention to the pathologies of internal security. In designing security processes and building structures to carry them out, leaders must consider the need to: accurately detect and recognize potentially harmful stresses and deviations; distinguish system from non-system inclusions; respond with sufficient strength to negate the threat; but not waste resources. Security arrangements must also allow moderate change so that the system can respond to a dynamic environment.
As an example of these design problems, consider national security. Although security forces are intended to protect a society, they sometimes undermine the society's stability or threaten its government. Typically, they are well designed to detect and recognize an enemy threat, but often poorly designed to distinguish the enemy from legitimate elements of the system. In order to maintain sufficient strength they often drain away a significant portion of the product and manpower of the society, making it less able to compete in other arenas such as commerce. Yet some nations, such as Switzerland, seem to have managed a better balance in their designs for security. By maintaining a well-trained reserve force rather than a large standing army, and by building behavioral standards into the culture rather than relying heavily on police, the Swiss have avoided draining the economy or mistreating citizens, while still maintaining an effective defense.
Organizations likewise would do well to consider more cross-training of reserves and greater emphasis on culture as a unifying influence. Over-reliance on external detection and control mechanisms may result in defenses that are too slow--they detect the damage after it is already done--and too costly. Many effective business firms have put the processes of detection and correction directly in the hands of operative employees, relying on their skills and commitment to organizational goals to ensure adequate defense of the organization. In doing so, they have added an inner layer to the more traditional lines of internal security.
In summary, the structures and processes associated with immunity and error correction in living systems may be regarded as part of the boundary subsystem. Given the abundance of life-threatening environmental stresses and internal strains on all living systems, these security structures and processes are critical and deserve much attention. Particularly at the organization and society levels, where security processes and structures are mostly artificial, more consideration should be given to design in order to avoid pathologies and provide sufficient coverage at a reasonable cost.
[1] R. W. Bosserman, 1982, "The Internal Security Subsystem." Behavioral Science Vol. 27: 95-103.
[2] J. G. Miller, 1978, Living Systems. New York: McGraw-Hill.
[3] Q. N. Myrvik and R. S. Weiser, 1984, Fundamentals of Immunology, 2nd Ed. Philadelphia: Lea and Febinger.
[4] P. Vidhyasekaran, 1988, Physiology of Disease Resistance in Plants. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press
[5] J. F. Walker and F. C. Thiemann, 1990, "The Relationship of the Internal Security System to Group Level Organization in Miller's Living Systems Theory." Behavioral Science Vol. 35: 147-153.